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The Application of Collateral Estoppel to Markman
Rulings: The Search for Logical and Effective Preclusion
of Patent Claim Constructions
Timothy Le Duc*
INTRODUCTION
1

In TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., the Southern District
Court of New York had the opportunity to promulgate the
appropriate preclusion standard for patent claims interpreted
2
in previous litigation. Numerous district courts have found
the creation of an effective and logical set of preclusion
3
standards for prior Markman rulings an extremely difficult
task. The TM Patents decision, which held that collateral
4
estoppel applied to prior patent claim construction, was
quickly criticized. For example, in Graco Children’s Products v.
5
Regalo Int’l LLC, the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania
refused to follow the reasoning or holding of the TM Patents
6
court. The court in Graco held that to bind a party to a prior
court ruling where that party did not have an opportunity or an
7
incentive to appeal is unjust. This view sharply contrasts with
the rationale behind the TM Patents decision, which defers to
* J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Electrical and
Computer Engineering, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Mr. Le Duc is a
former Naval Nuclear Submarine Officer.
1. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). The court held that the earlier
resolution of specific patent claims by another court, during a Markman
hearing in which the patent holder was afforded a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the meaning of the claims, was binding on the patent holder in the
subsequent litigation. It did not matter that the parties settled during trial.
See id. at 375.
2. See id. at 375.
3. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
The Supreme Court held that the construction of a patent claim is a question
of law to be determined by the judge, not a question of fact to be determined by
a jury. See id. at 391. See also infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
4. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
5. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
6. See id. at 663-65.
7. See id. at 664-65.
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judicial economy and the mitigation of unnecessary litigation.
The weighing of justice and judicial economy has rendered a
divisive split between the lower courts concerning whether
9
collateral estoppel should apply to Markman rulings.
This Note seeks to support the Eastern District Court of
10
Pennsylvania’s holding in Graco, along with other recent
rulings that support that court’s reasoning and disagree with
the TM Patents decision, and urges that the blanket application
of collateral estoppel to patent claim construction of previous
litigation is unjustified and illogical. Part I establishes the
relevant background of issue preclusion and patent claim
construction law. Part I also discusses the history and holdings
of TM Patents and Graco. Part II analyzes the two holdings
with respect to recent decisions. In addition, Part II discusses
possible solutions to resolve the current, increasing division of
authority.
Although TM Patents does contain significant policy
justifications, this Note concludes that the TM Patents court
has generated a significant legal controversy by promulgating
ineffective and unjust law. If followed, TM Patents will
increase rather than reduce litigation, further burdening the
judicial system. This is exactly the opposite of that decision’s
objective. Accordingly, this Note encourages the adoption of
the well-reasoned principles for which the Graco decision
stands.
The Note concludes that in order to strike an
appropriate
balance
between
judicial
economy
and
fundamental fairness, collateral estoppel of Markman rulings
should only apply if interlocutory appeals-of-right are available
to the parties of the previous litigation.

8. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
9. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elect. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464,
467-70 (W.D. Va. 2001) (district court rejected the TM Patents decision);
Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Indus., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 at
*11 and n.2 (W.D. Ky. June 25, 2001) (district court supported the TM Patents
decision).
10. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665 (holding that
collateral estoppel will not apply to Markman rulings of prior litigation whose
final decision was precluded by settlement).
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BACKGROUND

THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Issue preclusion, otherwise referred to as collateral
estoppel, prevents parties from contesting matters litigated and
11
decided during prior litigation. There are four requirements
that must be met before collateral estoppel applies. “First, the
12
issues raised in both proceedings must be identical.” Second,
during the prior proceeding, the issue must have been fully
13
litigated and decided. Third, the party against whom estoppel
is to be applied must have had a full and fair opportunity to
14
litigate the issue in a previous proceeding. Fourth, resolution
of the issue must have been essential to a final and valid
15
judgment on the merits. The doctrine is to promote judicial
economy by precluding relitigation of previously decided
16
issues, and the court has some discretion in determining
17
whether issue preclusion is appropriate.
However, the
application of collateral estoppel is not proper where it would
18
be unfair to either party.
One of the leading patent claim construction cases dealing
19
with collateral estoppel is A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp.
The court in A.B Dick declined to give preclusive effect to
statements it had made in previous litigation concerning the

11. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375.
12. Id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera
Santa, 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir. 1995)).
16. See Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 864, 866
(N.D. Cal. 2000). Specifically, collateral estoppel “precludes a plaintiff from
relitigating identical issues by merely ‘switching adversaries.’” Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979) (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am.
Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1942)). Additionally, a
plaintiff is precluded “from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had previously
litigated and lost against another defendant.” Id.
17. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 702 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
18. See id. “For example, offensive use of collateral estoppel, where a
plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating issues the defendant
previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff, should not be allowed
where it would be unfair to the defendant.” Id. (citing Parklane Hosiery, 439
U.S. at 331).
19. Id.
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20

scope of a patent. It reasoned that those statements were not
essential to the previous litigation’s outcome and therefore they
21
should not be given preclusive effect in the subsequent action.
The court was also convinced that it would be unfair to give a
claim construction ruling, unessential to the final judgment,
22
After completing a lengthy
collateral estoppel effect.
balancing test of various factors for and against issue
preclusion of prior claim construction, the court concluded that
judicial statements pertaining to the scope of the patent should
23
Additionally, the court stated that
be narrowly construed.
statements would be granted preclusive effect in subsequent
litigation only if the determination of the breadth of the claims
was essential to a final judgment, either on the question of
24
infringement or validity, in that prior litigation. Thus, broad
statements regarding the scope of the patent that are
25
inessential to a final judgment do not receive preclusive effect.
B.

PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND MARKMAN RULINGS

The question of whether the interpretation of a patent
claim is a matter of law or fact was decided by the Supreme
Court in the landmark decision Markman v. Westview
26
Instruments, Inc. Congress is empowered by the Constitution
to further the progress of science by granting inventors the
exclusive right to economically exploit their innovations for a
27
limited time. Accordingly, Congress exercised this authority

20. See id. at 704.
21. See id. Furthermore, the court noted that “[e]xcept in the context of
validity or infringement, judicial statements regarding the scope of patent
claims are hypothetical insofar as they purport to resolve the question of
whether prior art or products not before the court would, respectively,
anticipate or infringe the patent claims.” Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See Markman v. Westview Instuments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
The main issue was whether the legal construction of a patent claim, the
“portion of the patent document that defines the scope of the patentee’s rights,
is a matter of law reserved entirely for the court, or subject to a Seventh
Amendment guarantee that a jury will determine the meaning of any disputed
term of art about which expert testimony is offered.” Id.
27. See id. at 373. “The Constitution empowers Congress [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
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in 1790 by granting “inventors ‘the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the
patented invention’ in exchange for full disclosure of an
28
invention.”
In general, a patent must define the exact scope of an
invention and its manufacture. This is designed to secure for
the inventor all to which he is entitled and to provide the public
with notice of what subject matter is still available for the
29
taking. These dual objectives have come to be served by two
30
separate components of a patent document.
First, the
specification of a patent describes the invention in clear and
concise language such that one skilled in the art is able to
31
Second, a patent document
make the same invention.
includes one or more claims which specifically detail the subject
matter that the prospective patentee regards as the
32
innovation. The claims define the scope of the patent grant
33
and forbid the precise copying of an invention. Also forbidden
as infringement are products that make trivial changes so that
they effectively duplicate the previous invention without
34
Patent
copying the literal language of the previous claim.
lawsuits normally charge infringement. To obtain relief, the
patent holder must prove that his “patent claim covers the
35
alleged infringer’s product or process.” Thus, in order to prove
infringement, it is necessary to first determine the meaning
36
and the scope of the claim language.
The Court in Markman addressed whether patent claim
37
construction is a question of law or fact. Previously, “issues of
38
claim construction were submitted to a jury.”
The right of
trial by jury, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, existed
39
during the colonial era under English common law. Finding
Discoveries.” Id. (quoting the U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
28. Id. (quoting H.Schwartz, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (2d ed.
1995)).
29. See McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891).
30. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
32. See id.
33. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 373.
34. See id. at 373-74. This is known as the doctrine of equivalents.
35. Id. at 374.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 377.
38. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
39. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 370. The “Seventh Amendment right of
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40

“no exact antecedent” in old English common law for modern
patent claim construction, the Court determined that the best
eighteenth century analogue was the old practice for the
41
construction of patent specifications. The limited number of
patent cases available from that period do not reveal a wellestablished jury practice of specification interpretation that
would allow one to conclude that modern claim construction
42
should be a guaranteed jury issue. A judge, more than a jury
43
that may capriciously construe or refine the patent,
is
qualified with his legal training and experience to properly
44
construct extremely technical patents.
Finally, the Court
stressed that the consistent and uniform treatment of a
particular patent was significant enough to independently
45
justify claim interpretation as an issue of law. The Court also
noted that to encourage such uniformity, Congress established
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals as the sole appellate court
trial by jury is the right which existed under the English common law when
the Amendment was adopted.” Id. The Court reasoned that the answer to the
question of if the issue were one of law or fact depends “on whether the jury
must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the ‘substance of
the common-law right of trial by jury.’” Id. at 377 (quoting Colgrove v. Battin,
413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (internal citation omitted)).
40. Id. at 378.
41. See id. at 379. The Court compared “the modern practice to earlier
ones whose allocation to court or jury we do know” of and sought to draw “the
best analogy . . . between an old and . . . new” practice. Id. at 378.
42. See id. at 379-380. The Court found a “mere smattering of patent
cases” available from that period. Id.
43. See id. at 383. Also, the judge “is in a better position to ascertain
whether an expert’s proposed definition fully comports with the instrument as
a whole.” Id. at 371. The patent, “like other written instruments, . . . must be
interpreted as a whole . . . and the legal deductions drawn therefrom must be
conformable with the scope and purpose of the entire document.” Brown v.
Huger, 62 U.S. 305, 318 (1858).
44. See id. at 371.
45. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390. The Court focused on “the importance
of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to
allocate all issues of construction to the court.” Id. The Court reasoned that
the “limits of a patent must be known for the protection of the patentee, the
encouragement of inventive genius of others and the assurance that the
subject of the patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.” Id. (quoting
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938)). The
Court also noted otherwise a “zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would
discourage invention only a little less than unequivocal foreclosure of the
field.” Id. (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228,
236 (1942)). Also, the “public [would] be deprived of rights supposed to belong
to it, without being clearly told what it is that limits these rights.” Id.
(quoting Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 573 (1877)).
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46

for patent litigation and observed that greater uniformity
would strengthen the patent system by fostering industrial
47
innovation and technological growth.
Therefore, the Court
concluded that the extensive interpretive skill of judges, policy
considerations, and existing precedent all supported the
48
allocation of modern claim construction to the court. Thus,
the Court held that claim construction is a question of law,
solely for the court to determine, while the issue of
49
infringement remains a question of fact.
After the Markman decision, patent claim construction
50
became a question of law to be determined by the court.
Normally, the parties litigate the claim interpretation issues
51
before trial, which allows the court, at the outset of the suit, to
52
instruct the jury as to the scope of the patent claims.
A
court’s decision on the construction of the patent claims is now
appropriately known as a Markman ruling or order.
C. TM PATENTS, L.P. V. IBM CORP.
53

In TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp, the plaintiffs were
successors-in-interest to the patent estate of Thinking
Machines Corporation (TM), “a developer and manufacturer of
54
computers and peripheral computer equipment.”
The
plaintiffs brought suit against defendant IBM, alleging
55
infringement of three of TM’s patents by IBM products. Two
of the patents related to computer data storage technologies
56
and data error detection and correction.
The third patent
dealt with a communications routing strategy in parallel

46. See id.
47. See id. (referring to H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, at 20 (1981)).
48. See id. at 371.
49. See id. at 370-71. The Court held that the “construction of a patent,
including terms of art within its claim,” is a question of law, “exclusively
within the province of the court.” Id at 370. However, the issue of “whether
infringement occurred, is a question of fact for a jury.” Id. at 371.
50. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. 72 F. Supp. 2d 370 (S.D.N.Y 1999).
54. Id. at 374
55. See id.
56. See id. (United States Patent No. 4,899,342 (the ‘342 patent) and
United States Patent No. 5,202,979 (the ‘979 patent)).
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processors.
The district court recognized that the action against IBM
was not the first infringement action pertaining to the patents58
in-suit to reach the point of a Markman hearing. Previously,
TM had sued EMC Corporation, a competitor of IBM, in the
District Court for the District of Massachusetts, a case heard
59
by Chief Judge William G. Young. In a Markman hearing,
Chief Judge Young construed some, but not all, of the disputed
60
claims.
After a two day hearing, Judge Young issued his
61
ruling.
IBM asserted in the case against TM that TM was
collaterally estopped from relitigating the previous claim
62
interpretation.
TM, on the other hand, argued that the
previous Markman ruling, although substantially correct,
63
should not “be accorded former adjudication effect.”
TM
reasoned that this was the correct result because a settlement
was reached during trial in the prior case, rendering that
Markman ruling not “sufficiently final” to be accorded
64
preclusive effect.
The court in TM Patents concluded that IBM was correct,
while also recognizing that the case raised an issue of first
65
impression.
The court held that Judge Young’s Markman
ruling, which occurred after the patentee “had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the meaning” of the disputed terms, was
66
In reaching the
binding during the subsequent litigation.
conclusion that Markman rulings have preclusive effect, the
TM Patents court focused on the fourth and final element of
collateral estoppel: that the determination of the issues must
57. See id. (United States Patent No. 5,212,773 (the ‘773 patent)).
58. See id. at 375.
59. See id. (referring to TM Patents v. EMC Corp., Civil Action No. 9810206 (D. Mass. Jan. 27, 1999)).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. IBM argued that TM was “either collaterally or judicially
estopped to relitigate the claims that Judge Young construed – with which
constructions IBM (a non-party to the EMC action) is in substantial (though
not total) agreement.” Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. Id. “Judge Young’s resolution of the meaning of certain disputed
patent terms following a Markman hearing, at which TM had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the meaning of those terms, is binding on the Plaintiffs
in this action.” Id.
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have been essential to support a final and valid judgment.
TM argued that the dispute with EMC regarding the claim
interpretation was never elevated to final judgment status
because the action resulted in a settlement before a jury
68
returned a verdict on the issue of infringement. TM asserted
that there was no finality for former adjudication purposes
69
because a final, appealable judgment did not exist. However,
the court definitively denied that as being the law in any
70
circuit.
The court cited Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
71
Refining Co. for the proposition that, although a judgment is
not final as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, it can still be
considered final in the sense that the issues actually litigated
72
should be granted preclusive effect. As the court noted, the
question of whether a court will consider a ruling final depends
73
on numerous factors, including the opportunity for review.
The court also concurred with the view expressed by the
Lummus court that the entire decision may simply boil down to
whether the litigation of a particular matter has reached such a
point that there remains no compelling reason to litigate it any
74
further.
The court pointed to the Georgakis v. Eastern Air Lines,
75
76
Inc. decision as an illustration of the Lummus principle.
That case involved a plaintiff who sued the defendant airline
77
for injuries resulting from an airplane crash.
The plaintiff
sought summary judgment against the airline’s affirmative

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. The court strongly asserted “that is not the law in this Circuit
(or any other, for that matter).” Id.
71. 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961).
72. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 375-76 (“[I]t has been settled that a
judgment that is not ‘final’ in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 can nonetheless be
considered ‘final’ in the sense of precluding further litigation of issues that
were actually determined in such a judgment.”). Appellate courts have
“jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts.” 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
73. See id. at 376. “Whether a ruling is sufficiently final turns on ‘such
factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was not avowedly tentative),
the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.’” Id. (quoting
Lummus, 297 F.2d at 89).
74. See id.
75. 512 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
76. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
77. See Georgakis, 512 F. Supp. at 330.
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defense that plaintiff’s damages were limited to $75,000 by the
78
Warsaw Convention. However, in prior litigation arising from
the same crash, but involving a different passenger, this same
court granted summary judgment against the airline on the
79
same affirmative defense. In the subsequent Georgakis suit,
80
the plaintiff invoked collateral estoppel against the airline.
The airline argued that the interlocutory nature of the previous
81
decision precluded application of collateral estoppel.
However, the Georgakis court took an expansive view of
collateral estoppel. It stated “collateral estoppel does not
require a judgment ‘which ends the litigation . . . and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,’ . . . but
includes many dispositions which, though not final in that
82
sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated.”
The TM Patents court noted that, after the Markman
decision, claim construction became a question of law for the
83
court to determine. Frequently, the Markman hearing occurs
before the trial so at the outset of the case the court can
84
instruct the jury on the scope of the patent.
During the
Markman hearing, the court will limit itself to construing only
portions of the claims that are vital to the determination of the
85
issues of validity and infringement. Afterward, the jury must
86
adhere to the court’s interpretations of any disputed terms.
Thus, the TM Patents court reasoned that it is “hard to see”
how a determination can be much more final than a Markman
87
ruling.
The court found that TM and EMC were “ably represented”
during the previous litigation concerning the Markman
88
hearing.
The litigants identified the claim limitations in
89
dispute.
The court heard sufficient evidence to properly
78. See id. at 330-31.
79. See id. at 331-33.
80. See id. at 333.
81. See id.at 334.
82. Id. (quoting Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327
F.2d 944, 955 (2d Cir. 1964) (internal citations omitted)).
83. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. (“The parties identified certain claim limitations on whose
meaning they could not agree, and Judge Young heard whatever evidence he
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90

construe the disputed limitations and issue a detailed ruling,
after which the court permitted reargument and made several
91
modifications to the claim construction.
Then, at the
beginning of the trial in a preliminary jury instruction, Judge
92
Young read his claim interpretation to the jury. Judge Young
93
also used his construction to guide evidentiary rulings.
Additionally, copies of the claim construction were available to
94
the jurors during the course of the trial.
The TM Patents
court concluded that a verdict would not have altered the
95
previous Markman rulings of Judge Young.
The court
reasoned that nothing remained between the parties to
adjudicate on the question of claim interpretation, as the actual
application of the properly construed claim to the accused
device was immaterial to the finality of Judge Young’s prior
96
The TM Patents court stated that under
Markman ruling.
97
Lummus, the timing of the ruling was of no consequence.
Therefore, under existing precedent, the court considers
Markman rulings sufficiently final such that they are to be
98
accorded preclusive effect.
To support its holding, the TM Patents court noted that one
of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding the Markman
99
decision was to promote uniform claim construction.
The
thought necessary to interpret those limitations.”).
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 376-77.
94. See id. at 377.
95. See id.
96. See id. (“Nothing more remained to be adjudicated; nothing more
remained to be decided on the issue of claim construction. The application of
the claim to the product was immaterial to the finality of Judge Young’s
determinations.”).
97. See id. at 378.
98. See id. at 377. The court stated, “under Lummus and its progeny, the
results of the Markman hearing in the EMC action were sufficiently ‘final’ to
permit application of collateral estoppel – even though the matter to which
they were necessary was never reduced to a final judgment after verdict.” Id.
The court also cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13, cmt.
e (1980) (“A judgment may be final in a res judicata sense as to part of an
action although the litigation continues as to the rest.”); Sherman v. Jacobson,
247 F. Supp. 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting that a judgment “may be final
as to some matters, even though the litigation continues as to others”).
Id. (italics omitted).
99. See id. (“[O]ne of the Supreme Court’s rationales for upholding the
Federal Circuit’s ground-breaking decision in Markman was the promotion of
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court additionally recognized that prior to Markman, in Pfaff v.
100
Wells Electronics, Inc., the “Federal Circuit had held that
determination of the scope of a patent claim in a prior
infringement action could have collateral estoppel effect
101
The TM Patents
against the patentee in a subsequent case.”
court felt that the Markman decision had swung the pendulum
even farther.
Therefore, the court concluded that, after
Markman, it was inconceivable that a fully litigated Markman
ruling would not be accorded collateral estoppel in subsequent
102
given that the
suits involving the same disputed claims
103
ultimate goal of a Markman proceeding is finality.
D. GRACO CHILDREN’S PRODUCTS V. REGALO INT’L LLC
104

In Graco Children’s Products v. Regalo Int’l LLC, the
plaintiffs claimed infringement of their patent on an invention
105
for an easily transportable child’s playpen.
In a previous
suit, Graco claimed Century Products Company infringed the
106
same patent by making and selling the Fold ‘N Go.
In that
suit, the trial judge held a hearing and issued a ruling
107
pursuant to Markman.
In the ensuing jury trial, the jury
found infringement by the accused device under the doctrine of
108
equivalents.
Century appealed to the Federal Circuit Court
109
of Appeals, and Graco filed a cross-appeal to the Federal

uniformity in the meaning to be given to a patent claim.” (citing Markman,
517 U.S. at 390-91)).
100. 5 F.3d 514 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
101. TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (citing Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 517-18).
102. See id. “[I]t is inconceivable that a fully-litigated determination after
a first Markman hearing would not be preclusive in subsequent actions
involving the same disputed claims under the same patent.” (emphasis added).
Id.
103. See id.
104. 77 F. Supp. 2d 660 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
105. See id. at 661 (the patent-in-suit was United States Patent No.
4,811,437).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. The “jury also found that the Fold ‘N Go did not literally
infringe the ‘437 patent, that the infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents was not willful, and [sic] that the ‘437 patent is not invalid for
obviousness or lack of specificity.” Id. at 661-62. Also, the “court held that the
‘437 patent was not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.” Id. at 662.
109. See id. at 662.
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110

Circuit.
However, both the appeal and the cross-appeal were
111
dismissed when the parties reached a settlement.
In the subsequent Graco litigation, Regalo requested that
the court grant preclusive effect to the prior claim construction
of the patent-in-suit that resulted from the previous litigation
112
involving Graco.
On November 29, 1999, the court concluded
that Graco was not bound by the previous claim
113
interpretation.
In doing so, the court reasoned that the
previous parties lacked an adequate incentive to fully litigate
the claim construction because a settlement was reached before
114
Shortly thereafter,
the possibility of appellate review.
counsel for Graco advised the court of the recent TM Patents
decision issued by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, which held that a Markman
ruling possessed preclusive effect despite a subsequent
115
Accordingly, Regalo requested that the court
settlement.
116
reconsider its order in light of the TM Patents decision.
The court in Graco recognized that whether a patentee who
is the beneficiary of a favorable verdict in an infringement
action should be bound to that court’s claim construction was
117
an issue of first impression.
The court began by analyzing
118
Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser American Corp., in which the
district court erred in granting preclusive effect to a decision
119
from a previous infringement case.
The Federal Circuit
recognized that if a district court construed the claims
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id. Regalo requested that the court “find Graco to be bound by
issue preclusion to the prior claim interpretation from Graco I of the term
‘unitary central hub member’ found in claim 1 of the ‘437 patent.” Id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. The court requested that the parties provide “supplemental
briefing on the applicability of the first exception to the general rule of issue
preclusion, found in § 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, to the
case at hand. In addition, the parties were asked to examine Jackson Jordan,
Inc. v. Plasser American Corporation . . . and its effect on the instant action.”
Id. at n.3. The court realized that it was ruling on “an issue of first impression
regarding whether a party who receives a favorable verdict in a patent
infringement suit should be bound by the trial court’s interpretation of a term
within the claim of the patent at issue that becomes the subject of a
subsequent litigation.” Id.
118. 747 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
119. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663.

310

MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW

[Vol. 3:297

narrower than the patentee urged, that party could be said to
120
have effectively lost on that issue.
However, in its
application of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28(1),
the Federal Circuit noted that when a claim is ruled valid and
infringed on the basis of a narrow claim interpretation, the
121
Hence, in Jackson
patentee cannot appeal that construction.
Jordan there was no opportunity for review of the claim
construction because the patentee won on both the question of
122
Hence, issue preclusion was not
validity and infringement.
123
applicable.
The parties in Graco agreed that Jackson Jordan stands
for the proposition that the first exception to the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments § 28 is appropriate where a patentee
won an infringement action but remains convinced that the
124
And,
claim interpretation was construed too narrowly.
125
having won, the patentee has no incentive to appeal.
However, the parties disputed whether, after Markman,
Jackson Jordan was still good law and specifically identified
the TM Patents decision as the only court that had previously
126
addressed the topic.
The court in Graco noted that the TM Patents court had
reviewed the pre-Markman Federal Circuit decisions cited by
TM and concluded that the analysis of those suits was rendered
127
irrelevant in light of the goal of Markman hearings.
The
Graco court realized the significance of uniform and consistent
128
treatment of a particular patent.
However, it also strongly
argued that Markman did not stand for the proposition that the
application of issue preclusion would be guaranteed in every
instance, as the circumstances of a specific case may dictate a

120. See Jackson Jordan, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1577.
121. See id. at 1578.
122. See id. The court concluded that “under the first exception to issue
preclusion noted in Restatement § 28(1) (availability of review), Canron could
not invoke an estoppel against Plasser since Plasser won on both validity and
infringement.” Id.
123. See id.
124. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. There is “no question that, by instructing courts to decide
issues of claim construction in patent cases, the Court in Markman recognized
the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent.” Id.
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129

different result.
Additionally, the court cited Cybor Corp. v.
130
Fas Technologies, Inc.
for the proposition that Markman
131
solely addressed the respective trial roles of judge and jury.
The court also pointed out that the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 28 specifically provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between
the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a
matter of law have obtained review of the judgment in the
132
initial action[.]

With respect to Graco’s opportunity or incentive to appeal
the initial claim construction, Regalo pointed to the fact that
“Century did file an appeal prior to the settlement
133
agreement.”
This created an opportunity that would have
allowed Graco to file a cross-appeal on the issue of claim
134
construction. However, they chose not to.
“The subsequent
135
appeal was dismissed after a settlement was reached.”
Still,
the court disagreed with Regalo and concluded that collateral
estoppel was not applicable to the claim construction issue that
Graco lost because that issue could not be appealed by itself as
136
The court relied on
Graco won on its infringement claim.
137
Hartley v. Mentor Corp. for the proposition that, where a
“party wins on claim, but loses on issue, no issue preclusion
attaches to [the] lost issue which could not by itself be
138
139
Moreover, the court cited In re Freeman to
appealed.”
argue that former adjudication effect should only be granted to

129. See id. The Markman decision “did not guarantee that collateral
estoppel would apply in every case, and this Court will not extend the
Supreme Court ruling to mean as much, especially where, as here, the
circumstances of the instant action require that a different result be reached.”
Id.
130. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
131. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
132. Id. at 663-64 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
28(1) (1980)).
133. Id. at 664.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. See id.
137. 869 F.2d 1469, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
138. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
139. 30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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prior claim constructions if the interpretation was the reason
for losing on the question of infringement in the previous
140
action.
The court stated, “Graco did not lose the previous
litigation, but, instead, obtained a jury verdict in its favor
based on the doctrine of equivalents, making the court’s
interpretation of the term within the patent claim not essential
141
For further support of that
to the final judgment.”
142
proposition, the court cited A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp,
finding that the court would give preclusive effect to judicial
statements pertaining to the scope of the claims only if the
143
resolution of the scope was essential to a final judgment.
Furthermore, Graco’s argument convinced the court that
granting collateral estoppel effect to claim constructions would
144
discourage settlements and encourage appeals.
This would
result because a plaintiff who obtained a favorable outcome
would remain compelled to appeal an unacceptable, narrow
claim interpretation rather than be content with a winning
145
The court dismissed the
verdict or a profitable settlement.
defendant’s contention that those concerns give way to the
larger policy considerations behind the Markman decision.
Primarily, the public is entitled to know the scope of a patent
claim, and secondly, the relitigation of previously decided
issues results in an unnecessary burden on the judicial
146
The court reasoned that such countervailing
system.
considerations were absent in the case at hand. The prior
action involved only the interpretation of a single term in a
single claim and the previous litigants did not dispute the
147
Furthermore,
broader meaning of any claim in its entirety.
the court cited In re Freeman for the proposition that a court
140. See id. at 1466. The court stated, “to apply issue preclusion to a claim
interpretation issue decided in a prior infringement adjudication, ‘the
interpretation of the claim had to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case]
on the issue of infringement.’” Id. (quoting Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser
Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577).
141. Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
142. 713 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
143. See id. at 704. The court stated that “[j]udicial statements regarding
the scope of patent claims are entitled to collateral estoppel effect in a
subsequent infringement suit only to the extent that determination of scope
was essential to a final judgment on the question of validity or infringement.”
Id.
144. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
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has some discretion to decide whether a particular case is
appropriate for the application of issue preclusion because the
148
doctrine is premised on the principle of fairness.
Consequently, the court held that regardless of the importance
of uniform claim construction, the given circumstances of the
case at hand prevented preclusive effect from being applied to
149
the Markman ruling of the previous court.
II. AN APPROPRIATE PROCEDURAL SOLUTION TO
RESOLVE THE SPLIT OF AUTHORITY
Because of the drastically different holdings of TM Patents
and Graco, the lower federal courts have split on the issue of
the preclusive effect of prior claim constructions. While more
150
courts have begun to cite the two cases, there are two recent
cases from other districts squarely on point. The United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
wholeheartedly supported the TM Patents decision in Louisville
151
However, the United
Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries.
States District Court for the Western District of Virginia firmly
asserted that Graco embodied the correct analysis and result in
152
In these more
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Electric Corp.
recent cases, the patent holders had settled previous litigation
153
after a Markman ruling was issued.
The Louisville Bedding
154
court gave preclusive effect to the prior ruling, while the
148. See id.
149. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 665. The court stated
that despite the “importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent,
circumstances may exist where, as here, despite a previous court having held
a hearing on the claim construction of a patent pursuant to Markman,
collateral estoppel will not apply to such decisions.” Id.
150. See eg. Edberg v. CPI-The Alternative Supplier, Inc., 156 F. Supp 2d
190 (D. Conn. June 4, 2001); Allen-Bradley Co. v. Kollmorgan Corp., 199
F.R.D. 316 (E.D. Wis. 2001); Abbott Labs. v. Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d 667
(N.D. Ill 2000).
151. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 (W.D. Ky. June 25, 2001). That court
stated that “[i]t is not for this court to judge the correctness of a previous
judge’s claim interpretation in determining its preclusive effect.” Id. at *7.
152. 147 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D. Va. 2001).
153. See Louisville Bedding Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599. See also
Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (W.D. Va.
2001).
154. See Louisville Bedding Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9599 at *14
(stating that the “application of collateral estoppel is an issue to be determined
on a case-by-case basis. This court has applied the law regarding issue
preclusion to the circumstances of this case and finds it appropriate.”).
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155

THE POLICY BEHIND MARKMAN AND PATENT CLAIM
CONSISTENCY

One of the central issues in dispute in this debate is
whether a Markman ruling is “essential” to the final judgment
when the alleged “final judgment” is actually a consensual
settlement between the litigants. The policy behind the
Markman decision supports the proposition that a Markman
ruling followed by a settlement should not be accorded
preclusive effect where an actual final judgment is not
156
TM Patents correctly noted that the uniform
reached.
treatment of specific patent claims was one of the foundations
157
of the Court’s reasoning in Markman.
Indeed, there is no
question that a desire to provide the public with consistent
claim interpretations significantly factored into the Court’s
158
Those who promote the application of collateral
decision.
estoppel to Markman rulings support the notion that the
preclusion will advance the goal of uniform and consistent
159
patent claim constructions. Yet, it is “extremely ironic” that
in the cases mentioned above, the plaintiff patent holder had no
realistic opportunity, nor incentive, to have the Markman
ruling reviewed. After a settlement, the Federal Circuit is
deprived of jurisdiction over the matter and lacks the power to
review the Markman ruling, unless an interlocutory appeal is
160
However, even if a district court judge certifies an
certified.
interlocutory appeal, the Federal Circuit consistently declines
161
review of claim interpretations. Despite the Federal Circuit’s
strong inclination to refuse to entertain interlocutory appeals,
when the Federal Circuit does review a district court claim
construction, almost forty percent of the rulings are either

155. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 470. The court concluded
that “[c]ourts need not blindly apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to a
prior Markman ruling that construes a patent’s scope and claim.” Id.
156. See id. at 467.
157. See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 377 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
158. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id.
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162

changed or overturned.
Given the fact that nearly half of the
claim constructions reviewed by the Federal Circuit are either
changed or overturned, it is extremely difficult to explain why
the Federal Circuit generally declines to entertain interlocutory
appeals pertaining to patent claim construction.
The TM Patents proposition, that it is inconceivable not to
accord preclusive effect to a fully-litigated prior Markman
163
164
It is obvious that the desired
ruling, “contradicts logic.”
need for uniformity of patent claims and scope provided the
165
basis for the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Markman.
However, the Court’s analysis presumes that a district court’s
166
claim interpretation is accurate. It is highly unlikely that the
Court’s keen interest in consistency and uniformity outweighs
167
the greater interest in obtaining proper claim interpretation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court took an extreme interest in
patent uniformity in noting that the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals was created to be the exclusive avenue for review of
168
Clearly, with the Federal Circuit acting as the
patent suits.
ultimate interpreter on the issue of claim construction, the
169
desired uniformity was more realistically obtainable.
Additionally, although the TM Patents court correctly stated
that the Federal Circuit, even before Markman, had held that
collateral estoppel could apply to claim constructions of
170
previous infringement actions, it neglected to recognize that
the determinative word is “could,” not “should” or “will,” have
collateral estoppel effect.
Furthermore, while Markman
strongly and unquestionably supports the promotion of
uniformity in patent claim interpretation, it should not be
viewed to stand for the proposition that patent interpretations
will be blindly adopted as complete and accurate without the
opportunity to undergo the rigorous review of the Federal
162. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
163. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
164. Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468
(W.D. Va. 2001).
165. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
166. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
167. See id. The court stated that “[s]urely no judicial scholar would argue
the Supreme Court’s interests in uniformity is mutually exclusive to an
interest in a proper patent claim construction.” Id.
168. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390
(1996).
169. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp 2d at 468.
170. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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171

Circuit.
This is the only sensible approach in light of the
disturbing fact that nearly half of all the patent claim
constructions the Federal Circuit reviews are either revised or
172
overturned.
B.

MARKMAN RULING NOT ESSENTIAL TO A FINAL JUDGMENT
OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT

The Markman ruling must be essential to final judgment
173
for collateral estoppel to be applicable.
In TM Patents, the
court held that the claim constructions of the prior case were
sufficiently “final” to be granted preclusive effect even though
they were not reduced to a final judgment by way of a jury
174
The court admitted that it is not insignificant that
verdict.
the Federal Circuit never reviewed the previous claim
175
constructions.
However, that court also concluded that the
fact that the case settled was the sole reason that the Markman
176
ruling was not reviewed on appeal.
It continued to
definitively state that a “party who cuts off his right to review
by settling a disputed matter cannot complain that the
177
Finally, that court
question was never reviewed on appeal.”
held that the Markman rulings possessed preclusive effect for
178
two reasons.
First, the settlement did not vacate the
179
rulings.
Second, a Markman ruling possessed a unique
180
finality.
Admittedly, the Markman decision ushered in a new
181
standard for patent claim interpretation. However, it did not
obliterate the fact that all of the appeals originating from
patent litigation are heard by the United States Court of
182
The court in TM Patents
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
1999).
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
1999).
182.

See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
See supra text accompanying note 162.
See supra text accompanying note 15.
See supra text accompanying note 1.
TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 378 (S.D.N.Y.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at n.2.
See TM Patents, L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 370, 376 (S.D.N.Y.
See supra text accompanying note 46.
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misinterpreted the Markman decision as nullifying Federal
183
Circuit precedent regarding issue preclusion.
Although
Markman clearly specified that patent claim interpretation is a
question of law to be determined by a judge, and not a question
of fact to be determined by a jury, “it did not single-handedly
184
The rule
redefine ‘finality’ for collateral estoppel purposes.”
set forth in Jackson Jordan, that before preclusive effect would
be given to a prior claim construction, claim interpretation “had
to be the reason for the loss [in the prior case] on the issue of
185
infringement,” remains good law and should be followed. A
settlement cannot be blindly classified as a “loss.” At the very
least, an extensive balancing test of the items gained versus
conceded would have to be performed. Also, in at least one
sense, both sides actually win from a settlement as the time
and expense of further litigation are no longer expended.
The TM Patents court argued that a party who agrees to a
settlement cannot complain that the opportunity for appellate
186
This concept does not withstand scrutiny.
review is lost.
There are numerous reasons why parties have an incentive to
negotiate and reach a settlement, many of which have nothing
to do with the validity or the strength of an opponent’s cause of
action. For example, the goal of a settlement may simply be to
avoid the time and expense intertwined with further litigation.
Other reasons include prevention of a negative public image
and the accompanying economic ramifications of such an
image, and the desire to create or maintain a mutually
beneficial business relationship with the opponent. Numerous
other practical economic goals of a settlement also exist. Yet,
the TM Patents court failed to consider the possibility of their
existence.
Because of the above pragmatic analysis, a
187
should not be considered a final
“consensual settlement”
judgment because a settlement cannot be classified as a “loss”
of previous litigation. Therefore, the doctrine of collateral
188
estoppel is inappropriate.

183. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464,
467 (W.D. Va. 2001).
184. Id.
185. In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Jackson
Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1577); see also supra text
accompanying note 140.
186. See TM Patents, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 378.
187. Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
188. See id.
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THE NEGATIVE EFFECT PRECLUSION WOULD CAST OVER
POSSIBLE FUTURE SETTLEMENTS

The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel to an
unappealable order would certainly have a negative and
189
dramatic effect on settlements.
The reasoning of TM Patents
was that since a settlement precludes review, a party to that
settlement should not be allowed to argue that the issue never
190
However, as the court in Graco noted, appeals
appealed.
would be encouraged and settlements discouraged by the blind
191
application of collateral estoppel to Markman rulings.
The
court correctly reasoned that despite the existence of a
favorable verdict, a patentee would remain compelled to appeal
the narrow claim interpretation rather than be satisfied with
192
It is unquestionably unfair to deny
the result of the lawsuit.
a party an opportunity to appeal a potentially preclusive
Markman ruling. The court in TM Patents disregarded the fact
that the Federal Circuit consistently refuses to entertain the
193
The
review of claim interpretations on interlocutory appeal.
Federal Circuit revises or overturns more than forty percent of
all Markman rulings. It follows, then, that nearly half of the
district courts err while constructing patent claims. Logically,
before claim constructions can be accorded preclusive effect, the
Federal Circuit should grant the litigants the opportunity to
seek its review and the litigants should be given the
194
opportunity to seek the review of the Federal Circuit to
correct erroneous rulings and promote justice. The application
of collateral estoppel will significantly hinder, if not completely
195
eliminate, settlements during patent litigation as the party
on the receiving end of a damaging Markman ruling has little
incentive to settle, if it knows that the district court’s patent
189. See id. at 468.
190. See supra text accompanying note 177.
191. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 664.
192. See id. The court concluded that “[u]nder such circumstances, a
plaintiff who obtains a favorable verdict would still be compelled to file an
appeal rather than be content with winning the lawsuit or settling the case in
order to correct what they perceive as unduly narrow claim construction.” Id.
193. See supra text accompanying note 162. The TM Patents decision
seems to “ignore the reality that the Federal Circuit consistently refuses to
review lower court’s patent claim constructions on interlocutory appeal.”
Graco Children’s Prods., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
194. See id.
195. See id.
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claim construction will become “final” and hence unappealable.
Thus, there is little incentive for parties to settle if Markman
rulings are granted preclusive effect in future litigation as the
rulings would become virtually unreviewable as a result of a
196
settlement before a truly final judgment.
D. THE APPROPRIATE WEIGHT TO BE AFFORDED PRECEDENCE
REGARDING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION AND COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL
The TM Patents decision seemed to ignore any precedence
before Markman pertaining to collateral estoppel as it
considered the decisions inapplicable after taking into account
197
the rationale of Markman rulings.
Yet, the Kollmorgen court
reached the opposite conclusion and afforded pre-Markman
decisions precedential weight as their analysis of patent
198
In both TM Patents and Graco,
disputes were quite relevant.
the central question was whether, under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the determination of the issue in the
199
previous litigation was essential to a final judgment. In Pfaff
v. Wells Electronics, the Federal Circuit held that where a
previous case determined the scope of the patent’s claims and
that decision was essential to resolving the question of
200
for the claim
infringement, there is preclusive effect
interpretations in subsequent litigation. Additionally, in A.B.
Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., the Federal Circuit stated that
judicial comments concerning the breadth of the patent claims
are accorded former adjudication effect only if the resolution of
the scope was necessary to obtain a final judgment with respect
201
Thus, the application of
to either infringement or validity.
collateral estoppel is only appropriate if the Markman ruling
202
was essential to a final judgment.
Also, in Comair Rotron,
203
Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., the Federal Circuit stated that a
court may examine the particular circumstances of a given case
196. See id.
197. See Graco Children’s Prods., 77 F. Supp. 2d at 663.
198. See Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 464,
468 (W.D. Va. 2001).
199. See A.B. Dick Co., 713 F.2d at 702.
200. See Pfaff, 5 F.3d at 517.
201. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
202. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
203. 49 F.3d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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before concluding whether “justice, expediency, and the public
204
interest are served” by the application of collateral estoppel.
Therefore, even when all the elements of collateral estoppel are
present in a given scenario, it is still within the court’s power to
205
decline to apply the doctrine.
After a settlement, the litigation between the parties ends.
In patent cases, a settlement means that neither a court nor a
jury ever determined whether a defendant infringed upon the
patent holder’s patent. Thus, it is fair to say that the court
never reached a final judgment on the issue of infringement or
206
TM Patents cites Lummus Co. for the proposition
validity.
that whether a decision is considered “final” depends upon such
factors as the adequacy of the hearing, the availability of
207
appellate review, and the nature of the decision. However, as
the court in Kollmorgen succinctly and accurately described the
situation, the absence of “any realistic opportunity for Federal
Circuit review greatly outweighs the adequacy of the hearing
208
The fact that any
and the nature of the Markman Order.”
claim construction remains highly uncertain until the Federal
209
Circuit reviews it seriously reduces the incentive to settle.
Although Markman desired claim interpretation uniformity
210
and consistency, the almost absolute inability to have the
Markman ruling reviewed after settlement should be fatal to
the application of issue preclusion.
E.

POSSIBLE REMEDIES TO THE CURRENT SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY

Obviously, there is more than one solution to the current
dilemma of whether or not to give preclusive effect to Markman
rulings in suits that conclude with a settlement agreement.
One could follow the holding of TM Patents and always give

204. Id. at 1538.
205. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (citing Abbott Lab. v.
Dey, L.P., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 670).
206. See A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 713 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
207. See Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 90
(2d Cir. 1961).
208. Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 869.
209. See Cybor Corp. v. Fas Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1476 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
210. See Kollmorgen Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d at 469.
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preclusion effect to Markman rulings in the name of finality
and judicial economy, even if there is no true “final” judgment
due to a settlement. Yet, in cases similar to TM Patents,
injustice would result despite the court claiming that it had
reviewed the particular circumstances of the case and found no
good reasons for relitigation. However, the court’s review in
TM Patents was rather cursory, and the rationale for affording
preclusive effect is, at the very least, unpersuasive.
One could follow the extreme opposite route. The Graco
decision would have us conclude that preclusive effect should
almost never be granted to Markman rulings followed by a
settlement agreement. The reasoning, of course, would be that
due process outweighs the negative impact on the scarce
available judicial resources. Additionally, while such waste
may seem apparent on the face of the matter, as having
numerous Markman rulings on the same patent at the district
court level is inefficient, a more in-depth analysis leads one to
the inevitable conclusion that following the TM Patents
approach would result in an even larger drain of judicial
resources. The drain on judicial resources would occur as the
incentives to reach settlement agreements were overcome by
the realization that an unfavorable, unreviewable Markman
ruling would be given preclusive effect.
However, a middle ground would appease both sides in
their quests for judicial economy and due process, respectively.
After a Markman ruling is given, it should immediately become
appealable as-of-right. This would create the much-needed due
process for either side in the patent dispute that felt that the
claim construction was erroneous. It is particularly true in this
situation, given the astonishing fact that nearly forty percent of
all patent claim constructions are either revised or reversed by
211
The immediate appeal
the Federal Circuit after review.
would allow the Federal Circuit to rule on the claim
construction such that it would indeed become the final and
ultimate determination of the claims. Given the final patent
claim construction and the significant impact it has on patent
litigation, each party can make a fresh assessment of the legal
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions. The
probability of success or failure in the litigation will
appropriately affect each party’s motivation to settle and the
concessions gained or given in any possible agreement. With

211. See supra text accompanying note 162.
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the claim construction known, each party’s likelihood of success
during the impeding trial becomes significantly more clear.
Accused infringers facing broad constructions are more likely to
settle.
Additionally, patent holders receiving narrow
constructions are also more inclined to settle or, at the extreme,
no longer pursue the suit. In either scenario, the chance of
further litigation decreases.
Professor Craig Allen Nard of the University of Illinois has
noted that the Federal Circuit serves a unique role in the
212
promotion of patent certainty and uniformity.
However, he
213
argues the Federal Circuit is trying to have it “both ways” by
refusing to entertain interlocutory appeals solely regarding
claim construction, while simultaneously employing a de novo
214
Furthermore, the
standard of review for all final judgments.
acceptance of interlocutory appeals would promote early
215
certainty and foster settlement negotiations.
Professor Nard
recommended that, with respect to their sister courts’ claim
constructions, the district courts apply the doctrine of collateral
216
The
estoppel when the circumstances warrant its use.
application of collateral estoppel would “promote uniformity at
the district court level, and couple with interlocutory review,
217
Both of these concepts
would [also] promote early certainty.”
218
are “modern patent law mantras” because of their effect on
219
claim construction and ultimately the scope of the patent.
To promote early certainty, the Federal Circuit has a
220
procedural choice. The court can continue to utilize a de novo
standard of review after final judgment and commence
entertaining interlocutory appeals or change to significantly
221
However, as Professor Nard
narrower standard of review.
pointed out, the Federal Circuit could not employ both
222
effectively.
Additionally, Professor Nard concluded that the
212. See Symposium, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century:
Process Considerations in the Age of Markman and Mantras, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 355, 355 (2001) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Challenges].
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Id. at 356.
218. Intellectual Property Challenges, supra note 212, at 356.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 376.
221. See id.
222. See id.
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Federal Circuit is not about to alter the narrow standard of
review of final judgments, because, after the Cybor decision, de
novo review is the unquestionable standard the Federal Circuit
223
intends to apply.
Therefore, Professor Nard proposed that
the Court, pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, should
224
promulgate a new procedure pertaining to Markman rulings.
The rule would make Markman decisions appealable either as225
a-matter-of-discretion or as-a-matter-of-right.
The first option, to make Markman rulings appealable asa-matter-of-discretion, envisioned a rule allowing the Federal
Circuit to entertain an interlocutory appeal specifically on the
226
issue of claim construction.
The rule would be different from
227
the current § 1292(b) in that it would only apply to Markman
228
rulings.
However, even Professor Nard admitted that this
proposition might appear to be a questionable solution to the
229
problem.
Yet, he maintained that the proposal would exert
pressure on the Federal Circuit to actually entertain the appeal
230
because of the specific language of such a rule.
The proposed
rule would apply only to claim constructions and its creation
was in direct response to the unwillingness of the Federal
Circuit to entertain interlocutory appeals solely dealing with
231
Finally, Professor Nard strongly asserted
Markman rulings.
that the continuing persistence of the Federal Circuit in
refusing to grant interlocutory appeals provided reformers with
firmer ammunition upon which to debate that the court’s
discretion with respect to this issue should be limited or even
232
removed.
Professor Nard’s stronger and more justifiable position is
233
that Markman rulings should be made appealable as-of-right.
This proposal would be an “exception to the final judgment rule
234
in patent law,”
which held that a patent infringement
223. See id.
224. See Intellectual Property Challenges, supra note 212, at 377.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 378.
227. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1992).
228. See Intellectual Property Challenges, supra note 212, at 378.
229. See id. at 379. Professor Nard stated it “may seem like a wishy-washy
response.” Id.
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 377.
234. Intellectual Property Challenges, supra note 212, at 377.
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decision is final only after an accounting takes place.
On its
face, the as-of-right proposal might appear to be a “radical”
236
solution.
However, as Professor Nard pointed out, an
exception to the final judgment rule already exists in §
237
1292(c)(2),
which allows, before the completion of an
accounting, judgment on the issues of patent validity and
238
infringement to be appealed as-of-right.
The rationale for
this exception is the avoidance of economic waste, as the
expenditures associated with accountings was immense and if
the determination of liability were reversed, the resources
239
Promoting
spent to resolve the issue would be irretrievable.
the as-a-matter-of-discretion interlocutory appeals, versus
initially lobbying for as-of-right interlocutory appeals, may
actually prompt the appropriate rulemaking authorities to
240
establish such a novel rule in the first place. This result may
occur because the judges belonging to the various committees,
which possess the power to enact procedural change, would not
be limiting or removing the discretion currently enjoyed by
241
However, eventually the as-of-right
their colleagues.
interlocutory appeals may be required due to the reluctance of
the Federal Circuit to entertain claim construction
242
interlocutory appeals.
CONCLUSION
The controversial TM Patents decision started this ongoing
discussion as to whether or not collateral estoppel should apply
to Markman rulings subsequently followed by a settlement
agreement. Some federal district courts have followed that
decision, agreeing that the Court’s finality goal expressed in
Markman and judicial economy outweigh any possible
appearance of unfairness to the litigants, as they previously
have had their day in court to litigate the matter fully and
243
However, the court in Graco and others have strongly
fairly.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See id.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(2) (1992).
See Intellectual Property Challenges, supra note 212, at 377.
See id.
See id. at 378.
See id.
See id.
See e.g., Louisville Bedding Co. v. Perfect Fit Industries, 2001 U.S.
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244

asserted their disapproval of that reasoning.
These courts
believe that giving preclusive effect to prior Markman rulings
subsequently followed by settlement results in a violation of
due process. They pointed out that the litigants in the previous
suit did not have an opportunity, and in some situations lacked
an incentive, to appeal the prior Markman ruling. Over forty
percent of Markman rulings are revised or reversed on appeal.
Hence, in theory, the application of collateral estoppel to an
unappealable Markman ruling would give preclusive effect to
an erroneous decision in almost half of the cases. This qualifies
245
as a “really good reason” to relitigate the claim construction.
Additionally, the preclusive effect to Markman rulings in this
situation would decrease the number of settlements and
increase the average length of litigation. The result would be a
larger negative impact on judicial resources than the advantage
gained from the application of collateral estoppel to start with.
Furthermore, the Court in Markman did not abolish all prior
precedent on the application of collateral estoppel to claim
constructions. A settlement is not a final decision on the
question of validity or infringement. Thus, it should not be
246
viewed as such for collateral estoppel purposes. Opponents of
the application of collateral estoppel have more well-reasoned
arguments to support their conclusion. Therefore, until a
procedural change occurs, preclusive effect should not be
afforded.
The procedural change that would correctly solve the
problem is to make Markman rulings appealable as-of-right.
This would satisfy the primary concern of both sides in this
debate. The collateral estoppel supporters would receive their
finality of the Markman ruling before trial and in subsequent
trials, and thus achieve their much desired elimination of the
wasteful use of limited judicial resources. The opponents’
primary concern of a violation of due process would also be
alleviated, as every Markman ruling would be subject to the
Federal Circuit’s rigorous review. Therefore, collateral estoppel
effect should not be granted to Markman rulings subsequently
followed by a settlement agreement unless the rulings become
Dist. LEXIS 9599 (W.D. Ky. June 25, 2001).
244. See e.g., Kollmorgen Corp. v. Yaskawa Elec. Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d
464, 470 (W.D. Va. 2001).
245. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d
Cir. 1961).
246. See Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Plasser Amer. Corp., 747 F.2d 1567, 1567.
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subject to interlocutory appeals as-of-right.
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